savunmaanaliz Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Aviation

What can Unmanned Aircraft Systems contribute to Air Operation Functions? Potential Operational Benefits and Problems*

Abstract

The confusion regarding what to call an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) is going on for decades. It is because of various classifications along with numerous names and acronyms on this issue. Currently the term “unmanned aircraft system” is much more preferred than “unmanned aerial vehicle”, since discussing unmanned aircraft only in terms of a flying platform does not paint a realistic image of the equipment and the payload it carries, or the system on the ground which supports it. Furthermore, the latest discussion is focused on the word “unmanned”. Today, it is considered that there is nothing “unmanned” about the “system” except the aircraft itself. The intent of the shift to the term “UAS” is to indicate that there was much more to the “system” than simply the unmanned aircraft. Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA), on the other hand, is discussed to be a more accurate description of the “system” than is “UAS” to recognize more clearly that these systems are not unmanned.

Capabilities of UASs such as; range, endurance, payload, imagery resolution and many more are predicted to increase. These capabilities once developed shall provide opportunities to UASs to enhance its contribution in all spectrums of air operations. Their roles have already expanded to several areas including electronic attack and strike missions. It is expected that a single platform will be capable enough to carry missions such as out attacking the targets, intelligence gathering and control of the air missions. In some of these missions UASs have already been employed and for some missions we have to wait for some of time to let technological developments get materializes.

In this paper an endeavor has been made to analyze the UAS employment in entire spectrum of air operations, in relation to capability and capacity of UAS to respond to complex missions and varying threat levels in its current state and future aspirations from the system. In similar manner, transition from manned to unmanned systems is evaluated for short, medium and far terms solutions. Advantages and challenges of UASs are also discussed in terms of performance, autonomy, cost effectiveness, interoperability, vulnerability, capacity, bandwidth issues and legal issues.

1. Naming Problem

Between 1940s and 1950s, unmanned aircraft were usually referred to as ‘drones’ or ‘pilotless aircraft’[1]. By 1960s, the term “Remotely Piloted Vehicle” (RPV) was mostly used. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles appeared in the 1980s and the term remains in vogue till beginning of this century. Current terminology of unmanned aircraft system (UAS) has generally been the accepted term since 2004[2]. Decades ago a drone was originally defined as a pilotless, radio-controlled military target-towing aircraft. Today “drone” is the popular description for anything that flies without a pilot at the controls, whether it is controlled directly by an operator on the ground or is capable of autonomous flight with no direct human intervention.

UAV on the other hand, is an accurate description of an aircraft which is used to create a capability that relies on a “system” that consist of many more elements than the vehicle itself, such as (unmanned aircraft (UA) control system, ground control station (GCS), control link, a specialized data link and other related support equipment). The term “unmanned aircraft system” is now much more preferred than “unmanned aerial vehicle”, because discussing unmanned aircraft only in terms of a flying platform does not paint a realistic image of the equipment and the payload it carries, or the system on the ground which supports it[3].

The latest discussion is focused on the word “unmanned”, today, it is considered that there is nothing “unmanned” about the “system” except the aircraft itself, humans are integral to UAS operations. As per United States Air Force (USAF) documents, it requires roughly 200 people to actually conduct 24-hour operations and perform a strike (includes pilots/sensors, maintenance personnel, command chain, over watch chain, approval chain for strikes and intelligence support).

The intent of the shift to the term “UAS” was to indicate that there was much more to the “system” than simply the unmanned aircraft. However, Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) would be a more accurate description of the “system” than is “UAS” to recognize more clearly that these systems are not unmanned, that there is a pilot, there is a sensor operator[4]. However in this paper term UAS will be used.

2. UASs and Air Operation Functions

a. Advantages of UASs

UASs have both advantages and challenges. First of all, advantages of UASs will be discussed considering operational capabilities. UASs, compared to manned aircraft, have more endurance that enables them to provide long-range missions. Greater endurance is one of the most important performance determinants since UASs are not restricted by pilot fatigue and g-load. Additionally, they are more stealthy and agile compared to manned aircraft. The absence of an aircrew means that a great deal of space and weight can be saved. This means increased payload carriage capability or maybe smaller size platform with lower detection probability. Removal of human limitations can allow different performance factors to be developed and exploited like prolong flight hours, high G tolerance and high altitude endurance. When these features are combined together to analyze the effects, advantageous edge to UASs over manned aircraft in operation becomes quite obvious.

Besides being pilotless, UASs offers the added advantage of being relatively cheaper platform than manned one and having lower operating cost as well. A cost comparison between manned and unmanned aircraft is conducted by DARPA[5]. The comparison report concluded that the unit cost of an advanced combat unmanned aircraft would be less than one third that of an F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. This report not only considered the acquisition cost but also operation and support costs. It is considered that unmanned aircraft will be required to fly fewer sorties than manned aircraft, since there will be no need to fly training exercises to retain pilot proficiency. These aspects make them more expandable than manned aircraft. Since cost effectiveness is one of the biggest concerns of many modern armed forces, being expandable emerges as one of the notable benefit of UASs. In addition, high level of automation decreases training cost, enhances the utilization and success probability.

One of the most important factors in developing the UASs has been the compelling need to avoid aircrew casualties, or the risk of having an expansive manned platform shot down over hostile territory that is undesirable and unbearable in today’s public perception. UAS operating under high risk eliminates the loss of pilot factor, since there will be less need of manned aircraft to conduct complex and risky missions. There is no aircrew capture or casualty risk and this gives planners and commanders increased leadership risk tolerance that enhances operational flexibility and viability. This flexibility will enhance the deterrence level and offer the advantage of no human loss hence no combat personal recovery missions. Furthermore, loss of a pilot or capture of pilot by enemy, nowadays, means loss of prestige and morale.

UASs can perform an increasingly sophisticated array of missions due to their small size and decreased radar, acoustical, and infrared signatures. Reduced radar signature means greater chances to achieve operational surprise that will be translated into increased chances of success and survivability.

Owing to its range and endurance advantages the UAS systems shall maintain its presence over AOR for longer duration thus displaying a potent capability of ISR-strike for large numbers of dispersed, dynamic and time-sensitive targets from a single platform. Round the clock presence and real time picture are the ingredients for best situational awareness (SA). Having better SA enhances operational effectiveness. Differentiating between UAS operators and pilot, earlier ones are not time compressed and are provided with or have the option of more information by virtue of greater access to intelligence and battlefield information than to a fighter pilot in limited space of cockpit. Sufficient endurance can reduce logistic footprints in the operational area and reduce harmony issues by operating from rear base.

While operating in time compressed scenarios pilot’s problems are compounded if the targets are multiple and diverse thus causing issues of misidentification leading to either wrong target engagement or in many cases friendly fire causing collateral damage. The problem gets further aggravated once pilot come in decision making loop based upon limited picture in the cockpit. Where as in case of UAS controlled from ground station have the options of authentic identification, recognition and verification options from multiple sensor-fused pictures, where real time collective big picture is assessed and responded upon accordingly. Secondly engagements through precise miniaturized munitions have minimized the chances of collateral damages[6].

b. Spectrum and Transition of UAS Employment

Generally accepted categories of Air operations are; Strategic attack, offensive and defensive counter air operations, Land forces and Naval support missions, Airlift, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), Combat Support, Navigation and Positioning, Command and Control (C2), Weather Services, Air Refueling, Special Operations and Information Operations (IO)[7]. Some of the air operation functions require very complex mission planning, some of them are more risky than the others and some of them requires very instant decisions. Coupled with forecasted improvements in technology, it is expected that UAS will become all weather capable, much stronger, smaller and lighter over the next years. Their range, endurance, payload capability and imagery resolution are all predicted to increase. These capabilities once developed shall provide opportunities to UASs to make considerable contribution in all spectrums of air operations mentioned above.

ISR is the basic employment area of UAS. Without intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities it is not possible to perform the rest of the air operations. The ability to collect, process and disseminate information will dictate the probability of success or failure. The first applications of UASs were in ISR missions and it is expected this will increase. UAS can provide persistent surveillance for time sensitive and dynamic targeting. UASs have two basic limitations; limited bandwidth and they still require significant ground support.

UASs are no longer limited to perform ISR missions only, although this role still remains their predominant operation until recently. Now their roles have expanded to areas including electronic attack (EA) and strike missions. In future single platform shall be capable of attack, intelligence gathering and control of the air missions. In some of these missions UASs have already been employed and for some missions we have to wait some time for technological advancements.

SEAD/EW missions shall perhaps be the first area where micro and small UAVs will be widely used in a traditional combat role. In the context of OCA, SEAD is carried out by aircraft disabling an opponent’s area or local GBAD via hard and soft kill measures using EW and/or a variety of weapons to create favorable conditions for friendly operations. Lower detection probability and long loitering time are great advantages of UASs. Although an essential part of any OCA operation, SEAD is also conducted in support of other air operations, such as DCA and Counter-land Operations.[8]

Control of the air is one of air power’s most important contributions to the successful execution of a joint campaign. Once sufficient control of the air has been achieved, friendly forces can proceed at the optimum place and time without prohibitive air interference, whilst ensuring that friendly centers of gravity and military forces are safe from attack. Therefore achieving a measure of control of the air is of vital importance to all military operations[9].

Considering all these factors, spectrum of UAS employment in air operations is presented in Figure-1 by missions according to the level of threat and the level of mission complexity[10]. Y axis shows the mission complexity and X axis shows the threat level. Low mission complexity means, the mission is preplanned and no need to make instant decisions and high mission complexity means numerous complex, real-time decisions needed and highly situation dependent. We based our study on the assumption that there is a conventional joint operational area and two sides have balanced and compatible air powers. When unmanned aircraft fly over the enemy territory, they may encounter advanced surface-to-air missiles (SAM), fighter manned or unmanned aircraft in air-to-air combat, electronic interference to the communication links and on board sensors, and cyber attacks to control navigation and data links. For decades manned platforms have successfully executed all types of missions. As electronics and software advanced, unmanned aircraft became more capable. For now, UASs are mostly employed for low complex and low risk missions. However, due to the rapid technological progress, UASs will be employed in almost for all types mission. Yellow portion in figure one depicts the capability gap for the UASs is on the rise in highly complex mission area for all threat levels, these are generally air to air missions. The main reason for this gap is due to long satellite delay times and the SA required for quick decisions. Maybe manned-unmanned integration will be solution for this problem.

When same information is transferred on the time domain, it can be easily concluded that though number of the unmanned missions will increase but transition to full air operations spectrum may not happen in near future time as shown on the Graph-1. Blue bar on the graph shows that unmanned aircraft can perform more than 50 percent of the missions. Defensive and Offensive Counter Air Missions like CAP, fighter sweep, escort, armed recce, and ground attack for balanced forces will take some time for transition to unmanned aircraft. Even the UAS technology is maturing at fast pace; still there will be new manned platforms, like F-35 and SU-35, in the inventory until 2050s.It can be also concluded from the graph that, the composition of the mid-term and far-term force structure will consist of the right amount of manned and unmanned aircraft[11].

Graph-1. Transition from Manned to Unmanned Sytems

3. Challenges of UASs

There are challenges as well as advantages of UASs. One of the biggest challenges associated with UAVs is integration in air space. Currently there are problems to operate UASs together with manned aircraft and other systems. There are increasing numbers of UAVs operating in airspace. High Altitude UAS’s will have minimal impact on airspace control. However, Medium Altitude UAS’s will share the same airspace as most manned civil transports and military aircraft. Low Altitude UAS’s will share airspace with smaller manned aircraft including helicopters[12]. This integration problem is expected to be solved with network-enabled systems. Developing technologies regarding sensors and flight control procedures is needed. It’s obvious that effective integration of UASs would take some time.

The numbers of Time Sensitive Targeting (TST) and Dynamic Targeting (DT) missions are increasing and this may cause the wrong engagements and collateral damages. UASs have very bad public perceptions from Iraq and Afghanistan Operations due to wrong targeting leading to collateral damages, unnecessary civilian causalities and loss of properties. Laws of Armed Conflict may constrain high levels of automation/autonomy. Because authorizing a machine to make lethal combat decisions is contingent upon political and military leaders resolving legal and ethical questions. These include the appropriateness of machines possessing this ability, under what circumstances it should be employed, where responsibility for mistakes lies, and what limitations should be placed upon the autonomy of such systems[13].

Another challenge is that UAS in their current status are vulnerable to air-to-air missiles and AAA, as off now UASs are not carrying self-protection suits, air-to-air missiles or guns. Besides, communication and data links are vulnerable to cyber and communication link attacks. It may cause the re-tasking of the platform against the friendly forces or it may cause capture of unmanned aircraft and technology secrecy may get jeopardized. Most Air Forces have recognized cyberspace as an operational domain and establish commands for cyber defense. Solutions are available, from complex encryptions to counter jammers, and even a dedicated array of satellites for the command and control of UASs, but the costs are enormous. Also space dependency and delays may increase the need for autonomy. The demand for high-resolution videos will also increase the demand for high bandwidth.

4. Conclusion

UASs are becoming increasingly important element of many modern armed forces. Recent developments in electronics and aviation industry led to many applications of UAS in air operations. Today’s UASs provide very important but limited operational capabilities. Capabilities of UASs such as; range, endurance, payload, imagery resolution and many more are predicted to increase in near future. These capabilities once developed shall provide opportunities to UASs to enhance its contribution in all spectrums of air operations. Their roles have already expanded to several areas. It is expected that a single platform will be capable enough to carry missions such as attacking the targets, intelligence gathering and control of the air missions. In some of these missions UASs have already been employed and for some missions we have to wait for some of time to let technological developments get materializes. With increased capabilities UASs have proven their worth in recent air operations for unbalanced air powers. UASs are mostly employed for low complex and low risk missions where there is no serious opposing airpower existing like Afghanistan and Iraq Operations. We should pay attention to this result when we transfer our experience to doctrinal documents.

However, due to the rapid technological progress, UASs will be good for high-level risk missions and offer greater persistence over the operating area. Single platform is expected to be enough for ISR and attack missions. So that, UASs will be employed in almost for all types of missions. It is concluded that though number of the unmanned missions will increase but transition to full air operations spectrum may not happen in near future time. Defensive and Offensive Counter Air Mission will take some time for transition to unmanned systems. Even the UAS technology is maturing at fast pace, still there will be a need to manned platforms. The near future is unlikely to be one where UAS or manned systems have prevalence over the other. Rather, the future will be a hybrid force that employs the right weapon system for the task in question. In this term, some major changes are expected on force structure.

The new dimension brought by introduction of tactical weapons and electronic warfare payloads has only been a stepping-stone for further development. Proven to be beneficial, UASs will lead extensive research efforts and investments so as to find new ways of further contribution to air war fighting capabilities. Undoubtedly, these new concepts will make indispensable contributions to future air power.

* This article was presented at International Conference on Air and Space Power 2013 (ICAP’13)

References:

[1] Lt. Col. Lawrence Spinetta, “Remote Possibilities: Explaining Innovations in Airpower”.

[2] http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/uas/media/uas_fact_sheet.pdf, reached at June 2nd, 2013

[3] Lt.Col. J.L.D. Lachance, “Projecting Power: Alternative Futures For Canada’s Air Force In 2020”, 2010, p 23

[4] Lt.Gen.(Ret.) David Deptula. “The Future of Unmanned Air Power: Implications for Policy and Strategy, International Conference on Air and Space Power 2013 (ICAP’13)

[5] Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. “Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle Advanced Technology Demonstration (UCAV ATD)”. 9 March 1998.

[6] Franklin, Michael, “Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles: Opportunities for the Guided Weapons Industry?”, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2008

[7] NATO AJP-3.3, Joint Air And Space Operations Doctrine, July 2000

[8] Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2005-2030, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2005

[9] NATO AJP-3.3, Joint Air And Space Operations Doctrine, July 2000

[10] Buis, David. “Similar study was done before and presented by BOEING in 41^st Annual NDIA Symposium in 2003. Our study comprehends more air operation functions and makes evaluation for the balanced air powers.

[11] Lt.Col.Yucel TOPCU, International Conference on Air and Space Power 2013 (ICAP’13), March 28th 2013, Istanbul, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RbjNC0L0Gcs

[12] Transforming Joint Airpower, The Journal of JAPCC, Edition 3, 2006

[13] United States Air Force Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan 2009-2047